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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper mainly investigates how SME compensation affects their collapse and renders them 
unsustainable. We utilize annual time series data provided by America’s Small Business 
Administration from 1988 to 2014. We decompose SMEs into three size categories (micro, small and 
medium) and analyse the impact of compensation on the collapse of each of these sub-divisions to 
capture the extent this might help inform policy. Our ARDL Bounds Test shows that compensation 
and firm death have long-run relationship. Through VECM Granger causality analysis, we find a 
unidirectional causality running from compensation to firm death indicating that the compensation 
system to workers of SMEs significantly contributes to their sustainability.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Some key factors are broadly known to greatly 
influence the survival and sustainability of SMEs. 
One of such broad influence factors is firm-specific 
factors, regularly mentioned are the age and size of 
firms (Box 2008). Most SMEs are young firms and 
they are known to suffer liability of newness 
(Freeman, Carroll et al. 1983). SMEs are also known 
to be small firms so they suffer the liability of 
smallness hence face higher risk of death (Carroll 
and Hannan 2000).   
One reason behind the risk of liabilities of newness 
and smallness is that they negatively influence access 
to finance (Carreira and Silva 2010). One firm-
specific factor necessary to abate the risks of the 
liabilities of newness and smallness of SMEs is the 
quality of human resource that can turn the fortunes 
of the firm around and be able to withstand all risks 
of firm collapse. According to (Gomes and Kuehn 
2017), a more educated work force raises firm size 
and there exist correlation between a small-business’ 
ability to hire and ability to get financing (Peek 
2013). In addition, (Bailey 1993) argues that human 
resources are frequently "underutilized" because 
employees often perform below their maximum 
potential and that organizational efforts to elicit 
discretionary effort from employees are likely to 
provide returns in excess of any relevant costs.  
     One critical firm-specific influence factor on the 
quality and effectiveness of human capital is 
Compensation (Gupta and Shaw 2014). 
Compensation influences the quality of the people  
who are employed, the motivation and performance 
level of the employees, and the quality of those 
workers who stay with the company (Shaw and 
Gupta 2007, Dineen and Williamson 2012). It is 
evident that compensation has powerful incentive 
and sorting effects (Gerhart and Rynes 2003) despite 
contrary arguments by (Pfeffer 1998). In every part 
of organizational execution, compensation can shape 
employee behavior and their effectiveness. In the 
view of Gupta and Shaw, compensation systems not 
only influences employee motivation, but also can be 
used to improve safety, quality, creativity, innovation 
and many other outcomes vital in a successful 
workplace (Gupta and Shaw 2014). 
    Despite the importance of employees 
compensation to the sustainability of firms especially 
SMEs, literature is only rife with research on CEO 
compensation (Duong and Evans 2015, Olaniyi, 
Obembe et al. 2017), executive compensation 
(Lahlou and Navatte 2017, Yarram and Rice 2017), 
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Board compensation (Liu and Stark 2009, Müller 
2014, Dah and Frye 2017) but completely silent on 
employee compensation (Gupta and Shaw 2014). 
According to a meta-analysis of 40 years of research 
on financial incentives and performance (Jenkins Jr, 
Mitra et al. 1998) yielded about one per year 
employee compensation study and the situation has 
not improved in recent years (Gupta and Shaw 2014). 
     This study takes a step towards improving the 
situation. The main contribution of this paper is to 
investigate the extent to which SME’s inadequate 
employee compensation contributes to their collapse 
or sustainability. This paper seeks to inform 
government, corporate and other institutional policies 
on how best compensation package could be used to 
attract the best talents to surmount the challenges 
bedevilling the SME sector. The paper also seeks to 
draw the attention and interest of the research 
community to the importance of SME employee 
compensation. To the best of our knowledge, no such 
research has been conducted.      
 
Effects of Firm Size on SMEs 
 
     One of the most important factors influencing the 
risk of SMEs death is their size. The liability of 
smallness (Aldrich and Auster 1986) states that small 
firms are more likely to collapse than their larger 
counterparts. One important reason that accounts for 
this relationship is that small firms are more likely to 
face financial constraints (Carreira and Silva 2010). 
To raise their size and productivity, a more educated 
work force is necessary but this requires competitive 
wage (Gomes and Kuehn 2017). Furthermore, 
smaller firm size means smaller scale and therefore 
face cost disadvantages compared to larger firms 
(Audretsch and Mahmood 1994). 
 
Effects of Compensation on SMEs  
 
Because of surge in competitions, organizations seek 
to be more efficient and effective to get competitive 
edge.  This means SMEs must accomplish more with 
fewer employees and this calls for effective 
management of human resources. Typically, 
employee compensation system plays a major role in 
order to better manage human resources. Employee 
compensation plays such a key role because it is at 
the heart of the employment relationship, being 
critically important to both employees and employers. 
In addition, compensation decisions influence the 
employer's ability to compete for employees in the 
labour market (attract and retain), as well as their 
attitudes and behaviours whilst with the employer 
(Gerhart and Rynes 2003). 
Sustainability in SMEs 
Individual SME’s contribution towards sustainable 
development is small but collectively, SMEs have a 
very large impact on the development of a specific 
geographic area. The more presence of SMEs in the 
economy of a particular area, the more important is 
the SMEs’ role for achieving sustainability (A. 1993). 
But for SMEs to help achieve sustainability, their 
business must not collapse but be sustainable into the 
future (Brundtland 1987). Brundtland report 
emphasizes economic development as a key 
component in sustainable development.  
 
Theoretical Background 
This study draws direction from the combined effects 
of Expectancy, Reinforcement, Equity and Agency 
theories.  Expectancy theory focuses on the link 
between rewards and behaviours, although it 
emphasizes expected (rather than experienced) 
rewards. The implication of this theory in line with 
the well-established SME’s liability of smallness is 
that employees of high quality may elude most SMEs 
since they will be unable to compete favourable in 
the labour market because most SMEs will be unable 
to offer the competitive compensation package for 
the best talents in the market. Even when SMEs have 
managed to get the required talents, Reinforcement 
theory suggests that they may require higher 
compensation to be retained. Equity theory suggests 
that employee perceptions of what they contribute to 
the organization, what they get in return, and how 
their return-contribution ratio compares to others 
inside and outside the organization determines how 
fair they perceive their employment relationship 
Adams (Adams 1963). Where the comparison is not 
favourable as compared to larger firms, multinational 
corporations, world bodies and governmental 
institutions etc. employees may take actions such as 
quitting or lack of cooperation, thievery (Greenberg 
1990) which will eventually contribute to the 
collapse of the firm. Similarly, according to Agency 
theory (Fama and Jensen 1983), managers and 
owners may not be able to align the interest of the 
SME to that of the employees and this will be 
detrimental to the sustainability of the firm. 
 
 
Data 
We make use of a rich data set provided by the U.S. 
Small Business Administration (SBA)
1
. SBA is a 
                                                 
1Small Business Administration known as “SBA” was created in 1953 as 
an independent agency of the federal government to aid, counsel, assist 
and protect the interests of small businesses in the US. For more details: 
http://www.sba.gov/. 
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United States government agency that provides 
support to entrepreneurs and small businesses. 
According to the SBA, its mission is to maintain and 
strengthen the US economy by enabling the 
establishment and viability of small businesses and 
by assisting in the economic recovery of 
communities after disasters. The large data set spans 
from 1988 to 2014. The data describes employment 
size of firms that died from 1988 to 2014. It also 
includes a data set on the payroll of employment by 
size from 1988 to 2014. The data groups size of firm 
per the number of persons employed from 1-4, 5-9, 
10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499 range of 
employment. We define a firm as ‘micro’ if it has 
less than 20 employees; ‘small’ if it has 20 to 99 
employees; and ‘medium’ if it has 100 to 500 
employees. 
     We measure firm size by the number of 
employees in the firm and measure firm death by the 
number of employees those firms shed within the 
period of the study. We measure compensation by 
the yearly payroll of firm per the number of 
employees in the firm. 
 
METHODS  
We use econometrics model to analyse the data. 
 
Non-Stationary and Stationary Tests  
Our data covers 26 years and because different years 
have unique disturbances, the long-period time series 
data may experience random drift. For this reason, 
we first test non-stationary of our series by instituting 
autoregressive time series (Dickey and Fuller 1981),     
The Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test (Phillips and 
Perron 1988) and we follow this with  stationary test 
(Kwiatkowski, Phillips et al. 1992).  
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is one of the best 
known and most widely used unit root tests. 
Formulation: 
1 1
1 1 1
 where = - 1  and  -
p p p
t t i t i t i i j
i i j
y t y y b b      
  
  
 
         
 
  
…(1) 
     We use the generalized ADF equation that allows 
for deterministic specifications such as intercept, 
time trend and a number of lags up to p.  
     In conducting the ADF tests, correct specification 
is important. Intercept and trend should be included 
only when it is appropriate. We make this decision 
by running the regression and finding the intercept 
and or trend significant at 5% before we include in 
the model specification. We are also mindful that 
structural break could lead the test to indicate non-
stationary when it’s actually stationary. We graph our 
                                                                                
 
series data and examine them before making decision 
to test for structural break. We use Eviews 9 software 
to test if the coefficient on the lagged variable       
1t
y

 = 0. 
0
H : ty  = 0  
     The Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test differs from 
the ADF test mainly in how they deal with serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity in the errors. 
Formulation: 
1t t
y y u  

     ………………. (2) 
0
: 0H    
One advantage of the PP tests over the ADF tests is 
that the PP tests are robust to general forms of 
heteroskedasticity in the error term
t
u . Another 
advantage is that the user does not have to specify a 
lag length for the test regression (Phillips and Perron 
1988). 
     The ADF and PP unit root tests are for the null 
hypothesis that a time series ty  is I(1) or higher and 
therefore called non-stationary tests. Stationary tests, 
on the other hand, are for the null that ty  is I(0). The 
most commonly used stationary test is the KPSS test, 
(Kwiatkowski, Phillips et al. 1992). Formulation: 
0t t t
y D u    ………………………(3) 
Where 
t
D contains deterministic components and 
t

is a random walk and u is white noise  
      
ARDL model 
     If at least one of the series data is found to be 
integrated not in the same order of the other variables, 
then the traditional co-integration tests, usually 
produce false results since they require variables to 
be integrated in same order (Engle and Granger 
1987). To avoid the possibility of chaining out 
spurious regression, this paper institutes ARDL 
model developed by Pesaran et al. (Pesaran, Shin et 
al. 2001) to test the long run and short run 
relationship of our time series data. ARDL model 
institutes a bound test for the co-integration. ARDL 
approach of co-integration now enjoys increasing use 
in various disciplines like macroeconomics, applied 
finance, education economics, tourism, etc. Like 
many other researchers, one of the reasons why we 
utilize ARDL "bounds" testing approach to co-
integration in our study is that this model does not 
require all the series to be stationary in the same 
order even though it is inefficient if at least one 
variable is integrated in order two. The other reason 
is the ARDL Bounds Test has the power to detect 
long term relationship even in small samples such us 
ours. 
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We formulate our ARDL model as 1
st
Model: 
0 1 Ct tfd SME ompensation       ….(4) 
2
nd
 model: 
t 0 i t-i i t-i i t-i i t-i
1 t-1 2 t-1 3 t-1 4 t-1 t
fd = β + β Δfd + δ Δmicro + σ Δsmall + α Δmedium
θ fd +θ micro +θ small +θ medium +ε
    …
………… (5) 
     In line with US SBA’s categorization of SME 
using the number of employees, we decompose 
compensation into micro-firm compensation, small 
firm compensation and medium firm compensation 
where “fd” represents firm deaths (firms that could 
not be sustained), “micro” is compensation paid by 
micro firms, “small” is compensation paid by small 
firms and “medium” is compensation paid by 
medium scale firms. 
     Prior to testing whether there is a long-run 
relationship for the ARDL equation, it is essential to 
determine the most appropriate lag length for the 
model. Extremely short-lag lengths may lead to 
incorrect specification but we risk losing too many 
degrees of freedom if lag length is too long. By way 
of art, we use the rule of the thumb that says that 
maximum lag for annual data is either 1 or 2. We opt 
for 2 and use AIC information criteria to select the 
optimum lag length. This and other information 
criteria are based on a high log-likelihood value, with 
a "penalty" for including more lags to achieve the 
maximum lag length. One of the key assumptions of 
ARDL Bounds testing is that the errors in equation (4) 
above must not be serially correlated. To test the 
serial independence of our series data, we conduct 
residual diagnostic tests using Ramsey RESET Test, 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test and 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Heteroskedasticity Test as 
our residual diagnostic Tests (See table 3) after 
which we conduct Bounds test (see table 3). 
 
VECM Granger Causality Test 
     After examining the long run relationship between 
the variables, we use the Granger causality test to 
determine the causality between the variables. If 
there is co-integration between the series, then the 
VECM can be developed as follows: 
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Empirical Results and Discussions 
 
Table 1: Descriptive analysis 
 
All micro to medium figures are in hundred millions of US Dollars and SME 
figures are in billions of US Dollars except Min. figures that are also in hundred 
millions of US Dollars. 
 
Table 1 above presents descriptive analysis. It can be 
seen that, on the average, small enterprises pay 
higher compensation than both micro and medium 
scale enterprises. Medium scale enterprises which 
pay the least on average also have the largest 
standard deviation. 
 
Stationary/Non Stationary Test 
     In co-integration analysis, testing the non-
stationary of the variables is a necessary condition 
even though the ARDL method does not require pre-
testing the integration order of each variable, 
however, the non-stationary and stationary results 
can be used to confirm whether the ARDL model 
should be used or not since the approach requires that 
none of the variable under consideration must be 
integrated in order two (Pesaran, Shin et al. 2001). 
The result of non-stationary and stationary tests is 
presented in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Non-stationary and stationary tests 
 
     From equations 1, 2 and 3 for ADF, PP and KPSS 
respectively, the following results are generated. 
According to the ADF and PP tests, the null 
hypothesis that the time series are integrated in order 
one could not be rejected at 5% significance level for 
each of our variables since all the t-statistic values 
are greater than their respective critical values. 
Similar result is suggested by the KPSS, with the 
exception of firm deaths, where the t-statistics at 
level is greater than the critical value (see table 2). 
The combined effect of this result provides sufficient 
ground to conclude that the series are not stationary 
at level. At first difference analysis, all the t-statistic 
values are less than their respective critical values. 
This leads us to conclude that our variables are not 
stationary at level but become stationary at first 
difference. However, KPSS makes firm death result 
inconclusive.  
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The ADF, PPP and KPSS regressions include an intercept and trend. 
Optimal lags are determined using the Akaike Information Criterion. 
ADF and PP tests represents non-stationary test whilst the KPSS 
represents the stationary test. Each critical value is at 5% significant level. 
The ADF, PPP and KPSS regressions include an intercept and trend. 
Optimal lags are determined using the Akaike Information Criterion. 
ADF and PP tests represents non-stationary test whilst the KPSS 
represents the stationary test. Each critical value is at 5% significant level. 
 
Co-integration Analysis 
     According to the KPSS stationary test, at least one 
of our series data is integrated in l(0) and others in 
l(1). Under this inconclusive result, co-integration 
tests may produce false results since they require 
variables to be integrated in same order. So, this 
paper institutes ARDL model developed by Pesaran 
et al. to test the long run and short run relationship of 
our time series data (Pesaran, Shin et al. 2001). 
ARDL model institutes bounds test for the co-
integration and using equation 4 and 5 the results 
are presented in table 3. In our model 1 equation, 
where we use firm death as dependent variable and 
compensation paid to SME employees as 
independent variable, our results show that, F-
statistic value of 9.26 is greater than the upper bound 
value of 8.27 at 2.5% significant level. However, at 1% 
significant level, our F-statistic fall in-between the 
lower and upper bounds (see table 3).This result 
rejects the hypothesis of no co-integration. It 
therefore means that, at 2.5% significant level, 
sustainability of SMEs is co-integrated with SMEs 
compensation to their employees. Similarly, when we 
run model 2 with firm death as dependent variable 
and compensation paid to Micro firm, Small firm and 
Medium firm employees as independent variables, 
the F-statistic figure of 7.48 is higher than the upper 
bound value of 5.61 at 1% significant level. This 
result is interpreted that, at 1% significance level, the 
null hypothesis of no co-integration is rejected and it 
is concluded that there is co-integration relationship 
between firm death and SME compensation payment.  
When the SME compensation is used as dependent 
variable, the results show no evidence of co-
integration. We do not report these figures because 
they are not of interest in this paper. 
 
Table 3: Bounds Test for SME 
 
We use critical bounds from Pesaran et al. (2001) to make decision 
whether co-integration exists or not. Intercept and but no trend are used. 
AIC was used to select the optimum lag length for diagnostic tests 
      
To test the validity of our model with our target 
variable, firm death as dependent variable, we report 
the result in column 2 of table 3. We employ 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test and 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Heteroskedasticity Test as 
our residual diagnostic Tests. According to the 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test with 
calculated F-statistic value p-values, the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation is accepted.  
Similarly, according to the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroskedasticity Test for residual diagnostic, our 
models are free from Heteroscedasticity problem and 
this result suggests good models for our analysis. 
Ramsey RESET Test for model stability also 
suggests our two models are dynamically stable. 
 
Table 4: Long and Short Run Analysis 
 
                                                                               
Once co-integration relationship has been established, 
we now examine the long and short run impact of 
SME compensation on SMEs firm death. We present 
this result in table 4 above.   
Our results show a negative relationship between 
firm death and compensation. It is statistically at 5% 
level of significant. With the given coefficient, it is 
interpreted that a 100% increase in compensation for 
SMEs, micro, small and medium-scale enterprise 
employees will result in a 28%, 24%, 33% and 23% 
respective drop in the number of SMEs that collapse 
in the long term. Our finding confirms the combined 
effects Reinforcement and Expectancy Theories, 
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Equity Theory as well as Agency Theory. Also, 
Matching Theory argues that effective matches 
between SMEs firms that demand talent and 
employees with desired abilities occur when there are 
complementarities between employees productivity 
and firm-specific productivity (Pissarides 2000). Our 
results suggest SME are placed at the disadvantage 
side in seeking talents that can foster sustainable 
growth rather than collapse. Even when SMEs have 
managed to get talents through recruitment or 
training, Relative Deprivation Theory argues that 
individuals experience deprivation when they find 
that they have received fewer rewards than they 
deserve compared to rewards received by their 
reference groups (Cowherd and Levine 1992). Equity 
theory suggests that SMEs employee perceptions of 
what they contribute to the organization, what they 
get in return, and how their return-contribution ratio 
compares to others outside the organization, will fuel 
perceptions of inequity and cause employees to take 
actions to restore equity. Unfortunately, some such 
actions (e.g., quitting or lack of cooperation) may 
contribute immensely to firm deaths and make them 
unsustainable. This is because lack of adequate 
compensation from SMEs incapacitates owners to 
align workers’ interest to that of the company and 
this contributes to their collapse. The negative and 
statistically significant estimates for 1tECT   of 0.396 
lends support to long run relationship at 5%, 
significant level (see table 4 above).  
     In the short run, our results show that there is a 
statistically significant negative relationship between 
compensation and SME collapse. Specifically, we 
find that a 100% increase in compensation for SME, 
Micro, Small and Medium-Scale Enterprise 
employees will result in a 33%, 21%, 29% and 33% 
respective drop in the number of firms that were 
otherwise unsustainable.  
   
Impulse Response Function 
 From our result presented in fig 1 and 2, a one 
standard deviation positive shock to Compensation, 
receives both positive and negative reaction of firm 
death. In the case of small firms, firm death shows a 
negative impact as there is a decrease of close to 
seven thousand firm deaths in the first two years but 
these numbers inches down to above one thousand in 
the tenth year. A higher impact is seen in medium 
enterprises as there is a reduction of over thirteen 
thousand firm deaths in the firth year and a 
downward trend is seen after the tenth year.  Micro 
enterprise rather shows a positive impact but overall, 
we conclude that higher compensations in SME will 
help reverse the increasing number of firm that 
collapse on yearly basis.  
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Fig. 1. Impulse-Response Function 
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Fig. 2. Accumulated Impulse-Response Function 
 
VECM Granger Causality 
    To complete our analysis, we carry out Granger 
causality test to describe the direction of relationship 
between the variables. Since co-integration is 
confirmed in our study, there must be a 
unidirectional or bi-directional causality among the 
series. We examine this relation within the VECM 
framework. From equation 6 above, we run the 
model and report the VECM Granger causality result 
in Table 5 below. In our 1
st
 model which has firm 
death as the dependent variable and SME 
compensation as an independent variable, we find 
that the speed of adjustment towards long run 
equilibrium has the expected negative sign and it is 
statistically significant at 5% significance level, 
therefore it retains its economic interpretation. 
Because it is negative, it ensures that if there is a 
deviation in one direction, the correction will reverse 
in the other direction so to ensure that equilibrium is 
retained. This indicates that SME compensation 
granger causes firm death and makes them 
unsustainable in the long run dynamics. In our 2
nd
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model which also has firm death as the dependent 
variable but decompose SME compensation into 
micro firm compensation, small firm compensation 
and medium firm compensation as a separate 
independent variables, we find long run causality 
running from compensation of Micro, Small and 
Medium scale enterprise to firm death at 5%.  We 
also find short run causality running from Small and 
Medium scale enterprises to firm death.  
 
Table 5: The VECM Granger Causality Analysis 
 
 
We conduct stability diagnostic on our data. We use 
cumulative sum (CUSUM) of Recursive Residuals 
and the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMsq) of 
Recursive and present our result from fig. 3 to fig. 7. 
The graphs of CUSUM confirm stability of 
parameters (Brown 1975) but CUSUMsq test does 
not lie within the 5% critical bounds. However, on 
the whole, we find the graphs are within the critical 
bounds at 5% level of significance. This ensures the 
stability of long run and short run coefficients.  
 
Stability Diagnostics for VECM Walt Test 
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Fig. 3. Plot of CUSUM of Recursive Residuals with 
Firm death as dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Plot of CUSUM of Squares Recursive 
Residuals with Firm death as dependent variable 
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Fig. 5. Plot of CUSUM of Recursive Residuals with 
Micro as dependent variable 
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Fig. 6. Plot of CUSUM of Recursive Residuals with 
Small as dependent variable 
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Fig. 7.  Plot of CUSUM of Recursive Residuals with 
Medium as dependent variable 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper mainly investigates how SME 
compensation affects their collapse. We utilize 
annual time series data provided by America’s SBA 
from 1988 to 2014. We decompose SMEs into three 
size categories (micro, small and medium) and 
analyse the impact on each of the sub-division to 
capture the extent this might help inform policy at 
corporate level and beyond.  
     Our stationary and non-stationary analysis shows 
that compensation and firm death series are not 
stationary but have unit root. Our ARDL Bounds 
Test shows that compensation and firm deaths have 
long-run relationship. Through VECM Granger 
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causality analysis, we find a unidirectional causality 
running from compensation to firm death indicating 
that the inappropriate compensation payment to 
workers of SMEs contributes to collapsing that all 
important sector of various economies using the 
American economy as an example. 
Through the impact response analysis, we find that 
compensation package has more telling effect on 
medium scale enterprise followed by small scale and 
micro enterprises in that order. This separation 
suggests that compensation package may differ 
among the SME sub-categories. Our study is 
consistent with theories such as Expectancy theory 
Vroom (1964) Equity theory Agency theory Fama 
and Jensen (1983) that predict doom for inadequate 
compensation for best talents. The study is also 
consistent with literature that suggest that 
compensation could determine the success or 
otherwise of firms (Gomes and Kuehn 2017). This 
finding is important to policy makers. In the current 
efforts being made across the world to boost SMEs 
and save them from collapse, policies should be 
made to boost SME compensations and make it more 
competitive. Some of the reasons why increase in 
SME compensation will help them succeed is that 
their current salary levels are not competitive to that 
of the large corporations. This makes high talent 
employees prefer jobs offered by large corporation. 
Employees who end up in SMEs may not give up 
their best especially when they compare their 
compensation to their peers in large corporations and 
other institutions. We call for similar research in 
other countries. 
     Some limitations have to be considered with this 
paper. The paper did not analyse the financial 
strength of SMEs to be able to increase the 
compensation of their employees. The results of this 
study should therefore be implemented taking SME’s 
financial strength and other factors into consideration.   
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